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Abstract
A centralized inventory problem is a situation in which several agents face individual
inventory problems and make an agreement to coordinate their orders with the objective
of reducing costs. In this paper we identify a centralized inventory problem arising in a
farming community in northwestern Spain, model the problem using two alternative ap-
proaches, find the optimal inventory policies for both models, and propose allocation rules
for sharing the optimal costs in this context.
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1 Introduction
A centralized inventory problem is a situation in which several agents face individual inven-
tory problems and make an agreement to coordinate their orders with the objective of reducing
costs. The inventory management in a centralized inventory problem comprises the following
steps:
• Formulate a mathematical model describing the behavior of the inventory system.
• Identify an optimal inventory policy for the group of cooperating agents with respect to
the model.
• Decide how the optimal costs are shared by the agents.
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The analysis of centralized inventory problems using cooperative game theory has proved
to be very successful. Some early papers in this research stream for continuous review prob-
lems are Meca et al (2003) and Hartman and Dror (1996) in the deterministic and stochastic
contexts, respectively. The first papers dealing with deterministic periodic review papers from
a game theoretical perspective are van den Heuvel et al (2007) and Guardiola et al (2009). Hart-
man et al (2000) is a pioneering paper on the analysis of stochastic periodic review multi-agent
problems. Nagarajan and Sos˘ic´ (2008), Dror and Hartman (2011) and Fiestras-Janeiro et al.
(2012a) are recent surveys of centralized inventory models; Fiestras-Janeiro et al. (2011) re-
views the applications of cooperative game theory for sharing cost problems.
In this paper we identify a centralized inventory problem arising in a farming community in
northwestern Spain. It has to do with the dry feed that a set of farms order regularly from the
same supplier. Each farm faces a continuous review inventory problem with a deterministic
and linear demand, with no holding costs, with a limited capacity warehouse and without
shortages. The supplier charges the farms taking into account the order sizes only. Since the
supplier would prefer that the farms place joint orders, we suggest that it incorporates an order
fee. We deal with two types of order fees: one which is fixed and one which has a fixed part and
a variable part depending on the distance of the farm to the supplier. For the corresponding
two models we find the optimal inventory policies of the farms and propose allocation rules
for sharing the optimal costs. Our analysis generalizes those of Meca et al (2003) and Fiestras-
Janeiro et al. (2012b) for the case of no holding costs and limited capacity warehouses.
2 The problem
This problem was identified using the feedback obtained from dairy farmers and cattle feed
suppliers in northwestern Spain. A standard dairy farm in northwestern Spain has between
40 and 150 dairy cows. Typically, every dairy farm has an agreement with a dairy firm which
guarantees that the firm buys the dairy production of the farm. Usually, the agreements stip-
ulate conditions for the prices payed by the firm; sometimes, they also stipulate conditions for
the cow feeding.
In general, the cow feeding is varied and the feeding ration must have the necessary nutri-
ents to maintaining a high production of milk (between 25 and 35 liters per cow and day). The
feeding ration can be decomposed into two parts. On one hand, a part that has to be stored at
the farm in warehouses, called silos. On the other hand, a part that must be daily obtained and
that cannot be stored. We are interested in the management of the former part, the one that is
stored. From now on, we refer to this part of the feeding ration as the dry feed. The silos, where
the dry feed is stored, have a constant maintenance cost. Indeed, this cost is negligible and
can be considered to be zero. Each cow consumes about 10 kg of dry feed for producing about
30 liters of milk per day. This consumption is quite stable, so the demand in this inventory
problem can be considered to be deterministic.
The dry feed is ordered to an external supplier. Sometimes the supplier is the same dairy
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firm with which the farm has its agreement; sometimes the farm belongs to a cooperative which
has its own factory for producing cattle feed. In any case, it seems to be quite common that:
1. The supplier charges the farms taking into account the order sizes only. This means that
there is a price per ton of dry feed, which is independent on the number of orders per year
placed by a particular farm and on its location (in spite of the fact that transportation is
included in the price).
2. The supplier frequently faces organizational problems and prefers that the farms place
joint orders. Two advantageous consequences of that would be a relevant saving in the
transportation costs and a more efficient scheduling of the production plans in the factory.
The pricing structure indicated in item 1 is not appropriate if we are to get that farms place
joint orders. To get this, the supplier could charge a fee each time an order is placed, this fee
being the same whether the order is placed by a single farm or by a collection of farms which
place joint orders. There would be another ways to encourage farmers to place joint orders,
like for instance introducing quantity discounts. However, in this work we focus on the case of
charging a fee.
In this paper we introduce and analyze two models in which order fees are charged by the
supplier. In the first model these fees are fixed while in the second they have a fixed component
and a variable component which depends on the distances of the farms to the supplier.
3 The model with fixed order costs
A basic EOQ system without holding costs is a multiple agent situation where each agent faces a
continuous review inventory problem with a fixed order cost, with a deterministic and linear
demand, with no holding costs, with a limited capacity warehouse and without shortages. N
denotes the finite set of agents. The parameters associated to every i ∈ N in one of these
systems are:
• a > 0, the fixed cost per order,
• di > 0, the deterministic demand per time unit,
• Ki > 0, the capacity of i’s warehouse.
Notice that the problem in Section 2 fits this model if the supplier charges a fixed fee a each
time an order is placed. Observe that the optimal policy of an individual agent in this model is
very simple. Since the holding costs are zero, agent i must place orders of maximum size, i.e.
of size Ki, and then wait until the stock level is zero to place the next order.1 The length of each
1In this paper we assume that the waiting time since an order is posed until it is received is deterministic, in
which case it can be assumed to be zero. The deterministic nature of waiting times in this problem is realistic. In
principle, the supplier guarantees to serve the orders the next day after they are posed.
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cycle for agent i is thus Ki/di, a cycle being the time period between two consecutive orders,
and the optimal cost per time unit for agent i is given by:
Ci =
cost of a cycle
length of a cycle
=
a
Ki/di
= a
di
Ki
.
To illustrate the model, let us consider an example. The data in the example are fictitious,
although they are plausible, in the sense that they could have been taken from existing farms
in northwestern Spain.
Example 3.1. We consider an example with five dairy farms N = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5}. The farms have 40,
140, 120, 130 and 120 cows, respectively. The fixed cost per order is a = 200 (in euros) and the demand
(in tons per day) and the capacity of silos (in tons) for each dairy farm are given in the next table, whose
two last rows depict the ratio demand/capacity and the optimal individual cost per day of each farm,
respectively.
i 1 2 3 4 5
di 0.4 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.2
Ki 4 10 8 8 6
di/Ki 0.1 0.14 0.15 0.1625 0.2
Ci 20 28 30 32.5 40
Now, if the agents in N cooperate by placing joint orders, they must coordinate their cycles.
Since shortages are not allowed, the length of the joint cycle must be equal to the length of the
shortest individual optimal cycle. It is clear that if the agents in N pay the order cost only once
when ordering jointly, the order policy that minimize the total cost per time unit in this context
is the one considered above: they order jointly, adjusting their cycles to the shortest individual
optimal cycle. Then, for every non-empty S ⊂ N, the optimal cost per time unit is given by:
CS =
cost of a cycle
length of a cycle
=
a
mini∈S Ki/di
= a max
i∈S
di
Ki
.
Example 3.2. In the system in Example 3.1 the optimal cost per time unit for N (in euros per day) is
CN = a max
i∈N
di
Ki
= 200× 0.2 = 40,
which is significantly lower that the sum of the optimal individual costs per day if the agents in N do not
cooperate; this sum is 20+ 28+ 30+ 32.5+ 40 = 150.5. The reader may think that these amounts are
not relevant. However, dairy farms in northwestern Spain are usually small family businesses for which
costs of that magnitude are important.
Now that we have a model and an optimal policy for this model we consider the question
of how the total joint costs are allocated to the agents. For that purpose we use cooperative
game theory. Although we introduce all the game theoretic concepts that we use in this paper,
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the reader interested in more details on cooperative games can see González-Díaz et al (2010).
To start with, we give some definitions.
Definition 3.1. A cost game is a pair (N, c) where N is a finite set and c is a map from 2N (the class
of subsets of N) to R which satisfies that c(∅) = 0. Typically, for every non-empty S ⊂ N, c(S) is
interpreted as the minimum cost that the agents of S must hold if they cooperate.
For every basic EOQ system without holding costs (N, a, {di}i∈N , {Ki}i∈N) we can associate
a cost game (N, c) given by
c(S) = a max
i∈S
di
Ki
for every non-empty S ⊂ N. Here c(S) is simply CS, the optimal cost per time unit if the agents
in S cooperate.
The games associated to basic EOQ systems without holding costs belong to a well-known
class of cost games described in Littlechild and Owen (1973) to model a pricing problem in the
context of air transportation: the class of airport games.
Definition 3.2. An airport game is a cost game (N, c) such that:
• c(i) > 0 for every i ∈ N, and
• c(S) = max{c(i) | i ∈ S} for every non-empty S ⊂ N.
A relevant problem in cooperative game theory is the following: if a cost game (N, c) is
given, how should the total cost c(N) be allocated to the players? This is precisely the problem
we are facing now in this paper. To solve it, the concept of allocation rule is an important one.
Definition 3.3. An allocation rule for cost games is a map φ which associates for every cost game (N, c)
a vector φ(N, c) = (φi(N, c))i∈N ∈ RN . For every i ∈ N, φi(N, c) is the allocation that φ proposes for
the agent i in the cost game (N, c).
It is very convenient that an allocation for a particular cost game belongs to its core. The
core of a cost game is defined below.
Definition 3.4. Let (N, c) be a cost game. The core of (N, c) is the following set:
Core(N, c) = {x = (xi)i∈N ∈ RN | ∑
i∈N
xi = c(N) and ∑
i∈S
xi ≤ c(S) ∀S ⊂ N}.
If x ∈ Core(N, c), then x is a stable allocation, in the sense that it does not disappoint any of
the possible coalitions within N. Notice that the core of a cost game can be an empty set.
One of the most important allocation rules for cost games is the Shapley value (see Shapley
(1953)). A recent survey on this allocation rule is Moretti and Patrone (2008). In particular, the
Shapley value is specially convenient for airport games (see, for instance, González-Díaz et al
(2010)). The following result was proved in Littlechild and Owen (1973).
Theorem 3.1. Let (N, c) be an airport game and let Φ denote the Shapley value. Then,
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1. Φ(N, c) ∈ Core(N, c).
2. Assume without loss of generality that the agents in N are arranged in non-decreasing order of
their ratios di/Ki, i.e. that d1/K1 ≤ · · · ≤ dn/Kn (n denotes the number of elements of N).
Then,
Φi(N, c) =
c(1)
n
+
i
∑
j=2
c(j)− c(j− 1)
n− j + 1 . (1)
In view of the comments and results above, it seems that the Shapley value is a good choice
for allocating the joint costs in a basic EOQ system without holding costs. To finish this section
we obtain the proposal of the Shapley value for the system in Example 3.1.
Example 3.3. Take the system in Example 3.1 and denote by (N, c) its associated cost game. For every
i ∈ N, c(i) equals the amount Ci in the table of Example 3.1. Then, using (1), it is easily obtained that:
Φ(N, c) = (4, 6, 6.667, 7.917, 15.417).
4 The model with transportation costs
A basic EOQ system without holding costs and with transportation costs is a multiple agent situation
where each agent faces a continuous review inventory problem with a variable order cost, with
a deterministic and linear demand, with no holding costs, with a limited capacity warehouse
and without shortages. In fact, the variable order cost of each agent has two components: a
fixed component and a variable component which is due to transportation costs and depends
on the distance of the agent to the supplier. N denotes the finite set of agents. The parameters
associated to every i ∈ N in one of these systems are:
• a > 0, the fixed cost per order,
• ai > 0, the transportation cost per order,
• di > 0, the deterministic demand per time unit,
• Ki > 0, the capacity of i’s warehouse.
We also make the following two assumptions.
A1 All the agents are located on the same line route. We mean that if a group of agents S
places a joint order, the correponding fixed cost is the sum of the first component a plus
the second component of an agent in S whose distance from the supplier is maximal.
A2 The supplier accepts and even encourages agents to order jointly. At the beginning of the
term the supplier asks what order coalitions have formed and, because of organizational
reasons, once an order coalition S ⊂ N has been formed, the order fee that the supplier
charges to this coalition, for each order throughout the term, is a +maxi∈S ai.
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This model is inspired in the inventory transportation situations treated in Fiestras-Janeiro
et al (2012b). However, it is completely different, because now holding costs are zero and the
capacities of the warehouses are limited. Notice that the problem in Section 2 fits this model
if the supplier charges a fixed order fee plus a transportation order fee each time an order is
placed. Assumptions A1 and A2 seem to be acceptable in many cases for the problem in Section
2.
Like in the model with fixed costs, the optimal policy of an individual agent in this model
is very simple. Since the holding costs are zero, agent i must place orders of maximum size, i.e.
of size Ki, and then wait until the stock level is zero to place the next order. The length of each
cycle for agent i is thus Ki/di and the optimal cost per time unit for agent i is given by:
Ci =
cost of a cycle
length of a cycle
=
a + ai
Ki/di
= (a + ai)
di
Ki
.
To illustrate the results in this section we use the system in Example 3.1.
Example 4.1. Suppose that in the system of Example 3.1, the supplier poses a fixed order fee a = 200
plus a transportation fee depending on the distances to the farms. Suppose also that assumptions A1 and
A2 hold and take the transportation fees: a1 = 150, a2 = 250, a3 = 100, a4 = 200, and a5 = 100.
All the fees are given in euros. The optimal individual cost per day of each farm is given in the following
table.
i 1 2 3 4 5
di 0.4 1.4 1.2 1.3 1.2
Ki 4 10 8 8 6
ai 150 250 100 200 100
di/Ki 0.1 0.14 0.15 0.1625 0.2
Ci 35 63 45 65 60
Now, if the agents of a non-empty coalition S ⊂ N cooperate by placing joint orders, they
must coordinate their cycles. Since shortages are not allowed, the length of the joint cycle must
be equal to the length of the shortest individual optimal cycle. It is clear that this is the optimal
policy for the agents in S if they agree to make joint orders and assumptions A1 and A2 are
satisfied. Formally, for every non-empty S ⊂ N, the optimal cost per time unit if the members
of S agree to place joint orders is given by:
CS =
cost of a cycle
length of a cycle
=
maxi∈S{a + ai}
minj∈S{Kj/dj} = maxi∈S {(a + ai)}maxj∈S {
dj
Kj
} = max
i∈S
max
j∈S
{(a + ai)
dj
Kj
}.
In this way we can associate a cost game to every basic EOQ system without holding costs and
with transportation costs.
Definition 4.1. For every basic EOQ system without holding costs and with transportation costs
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(N, a, {ai}i∈N , {di}i∈N , {Ki}i∈N) we can associate a cost game (N, c) given by
c(S) = max
i∈S
max
j∈S
{(a + ai)
dj
Kj
} (2)
for every non-empty S ⊂ N. Here c(S) is simply CS, the optimal cost per time unit if the agents in S
agree to place joint orders.
In the system in Example 4.1 the optimal cost per day for N is
c(N) = max
i∈N
max
j∈N
{(a + ai)
dj
Kj
} = 450× 0.2 = 90,
which is significantly lower that the sum of the optimal individual costs per day if the agents
in N do not cooperate; this sum is ∑i∈N c(i) = 35 + 63 + 45 + 65 + 60 = 268. Unfortunately,
this is not true in general, as we illustrate in the following example.
Example 4.2. Consider a system with two agents N = {1, 2}. The fixed cost per order (in euros) is
a = 200 and the demand (in tons per day), the capacity of the warehouses (in tons) and the transportation
cost per order (in euros) for each agent are given in the table below, whose two last rows depict the ratio
demand/capacity and the optimal individual cost per day of each agent, respectively.
i 1 2
di 0.2 0.8
Ki 8 6
ai 700 300
di/Ki 0.025 0.133
Ci 22.5 66.667
The associated cost game is the following:
S {1} {2} {1, 2}
c(S) 22.5 66.667 120
In this case
c(1) + c(2) = 22.5+ 66.667 = 89.167 < c({1, 2}) = 120.
Example 4.2 shows that not every cost game associated to a basic EOQ system without hold-
ing costs and with transportation costs is subadditive, in the sense of the following definition.
Definition 4.2. Let (N, c) a cost game. (N, c) is said to be subadditive if, for all non-empty S, T ⊂ N
with S ∩ T = ∅, it holds that c(S ∪ T) ≤ c(S) + c(T).
We now wonder under what conditions cooperation is profitable in a basic EOQ system
without holding costs and with transportation costs or, equivalently, under what conditions
the associated cost game of such a system is subadditive. The next result provides a reply to
this question. It says that the associated cost game of a basic EOQ system without holding
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costs and with transportation costs is subadditive if and only if, for every non-empty disjoint
coalitions S, T ⊂ N, with T farther that S, either the number of orders of T is greater than S, or
the number of orders of S is increased, need not be excessively large relative to the number of
orders of T.
Theorem 4.1. Let (N, a, {ai}i∈N , {di}i∈N , {Ki}i∈N) be a basic EOQ system without holding costs and
with transportation costs, and let (N, c) be its associated cost game. Then (N, c) is subadditive if and
only if, for every non-empty S, T ⊂ N with S ∩ T = ∅ and maxi∈S{ai} ≤ maxi∈T{ai}, at least one of
the two following conditions holds:
1. maxi∈S{ diKi } ≤ maxi∈T{
di
Ki
}.
2. maxi∈S{ diKi } > maxi∈T{
di
Ki
} and maxi∈T{ai}−maxi∈S{ai}a+maxi∈T{ai} ≤
maxi∈T{ diKi }
maxi∈S{ diKi }
.
Proof. See Appendix.
Now we have a model and an optimal policy for this model provided that a coalition of
agents decides to place joint orders. We also know under what conditions cooperation is prof-
itable for that coalition. Next we consider the question of how the total joint costs are allocated
among the agents.
First we prove that if cooperation is profitable in a basic EOQ system without holding costs
and with transportation costs, then we can find a stable allocation of the total joint costs. In
game theoretical terms, we prove that if the cost game associated to a basic EOQ system without
holding costs and with transportation costs is subadditive, then its core is non-empty. For this
proof, we need some concepts and notations in relation with a cost game (N, c).
We denote by Π(N) the set of all permutations in N. Formally, every σ ∈ Π(N) is a one-to-
one map which associates to every element of N a natural number in {1, 2, . . . , n} (n denotes the
number of elements of N). σ(i) = j means that i has the j-th position in the ordering given by σ.
Denote by σ−1 the inverse of map σ. For every i ∈ N, the set of predecessors of i with respect to
σ ∈ Π(N) is Pσi = {j ∈ N | σ(j) < σ(i)}. Now take σ ∈ Π(N); the marginal vector associated
with σ is defined as mσ(N, c) = (mσi (N, c))i∈N , where m
σ
i (N, c) = c(P
σ
i ∪ {i})− c(Pσi ) for each
i ∈ N. Notice that for every marginal vector mσ, it holds that ∑i∈N mσi (N, c) = c(N). Hence, a
marginal vector of (N, c) is an allocation of c(N) which allocates to every i its contribution to
its predecessors according to a particular permutation.
Theorem 4.2. Let (N, a, {ai}i∈N , {di}i∈N , {Ki}i∈N) be a basic EOQ system without holding costs and
with transportation costs, and let (N, c) be its associated cost game. Assume that (N, c) is subadditive.
Then, Core(N, c) is non-empty.
Proof. See Appendix.
As in the previous section, we would like to identify an allocation rule which has good
properties for the class of games associated to basic EOQ systems without holding costs and
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with transportation costs. The following example shows that the Shapley value may provide
allocations outside the core in this context even when the cost game is subadditive. Recall that
the Shapley value of a cost game (N, c) is the vector Φ(N, c) = (Φi(N, c))i∈N given by
Φi(N, c) =
1
|Π(N)| ∑
σ∈Π(N)
mσi (N, c)
for all i ∈ N.
Example 4.3. Take a basic EOQ system without holding costs and with transportation costs with N =
{1, 2, 3}. The fixed cost per order (in euros) is a = 400 and the demand (in tons per day), the capacity of
warehouses (in tons) and the variable cost per order (in euros) for each agent are given in the next table,
whose two last rows depict the ratio demand/capacity and the optimal individual cost per day of each
agent, respectively.
i 1 2 3
di 2 2 5
Ki 9 8 7
ai 300 500 200
di/Ki 0.222 0.25 0.714
Ci 155.556 225 428.571
The associated cost game is the following.
S {1} {2} {3} {1, 2} {1, 3} {2, 3} {1, 2,3}
c(S) 155.556 225 428.571 225 500 642.857 642.857
It is easy to check that (N, c) is subadditive using Theorem 4.1. Moreover, Theorem 4.2 implies that
Core(N, c) 6= ∅. Nevertheless, the proposal of the Shapley value is not in the core of (N, c). In fact,
after some algebra it can be obtained that
Φ(N, c) = (63.7566, 169.9074, 409.1931).
Since Φ1(N, c) + Φ2(N, c) = 63.757 + 169.907 = 233.664 > 225 = c({1, 2}), then Φ(N, c) 6∈
Core(N, c).
Now we define an allocation rule which always proposes core allocations in this context.
Let (N, a, {ai}i∈N , {di}i∈N , {Ki}i∈N) be a basic EOQ system without holding costs and with
transportation costs, and let (N, c) be its associated cost game. Consider the following two sets
of permutations:
• Π1(N, c) = {σ ∈ Π(N) | ai ≥ aj implies that σ(i) ≤ σ(j), for all i, j ∈ N}. So, Π1(N, c) is
the set of permutations which reverse the ordering given by the transportation costs.
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• Π2(N, c) = {σ ∈ Π(N) | diKi ≥
dj
Kj
implies that σ(i) ≤ σ(j), for all i, j ∈ N}. So,Π2(N, c) is
the set of permutations which reverse the ordering given by the ratios demand/capacity.
Our allocation rule proposes for (N, c) the mean of the average of the marginal vectors asso-
ciated with permutations in Π1(N, c) and the average of the marginal vectors associated with
permutations in Π2(N, c). We call this rule the two-lines rule because it is a kind of generaliza-
tion of the line rule introduced in Fiestras-Janeiro et al (2012b). Formally, for any i ∈ N,
TLi(N, c) =
1
2|Π1(N, c)| ∑σ∈Π1(N,c)
mσi (N, c) +
1
2|Π2(N, c)| ∑σ∈Π2(N,c)
mσi (N, c),
where TL denotes the two-lines rule.
Notice that all permutations σ ∈ Π1(N, I) satisfy that σ−1(1) is an agent whose distance
to the supplier is maximal. In the proof of Theorem 4.2 we showed that the marginal vectors
associated with all such permutations belong to Core(N, c) (if (N, c) is subadditive). It could
have been demonstrated in an analogous way that all marginal vectors associated with permu-
tations σ satisfying that σ−1(1) is an agent with a maximal ratio demand/capacity also belong
to Core(N, c) if (N, c) is subadditive. Then, taking into account that Core(N, c) is a convex set,
it is clear that the following result holds.
Theorem 4.3. Let (N, a, {ai}i∈N , {di}i∈N , {Ki}i∈N) be a basic EOQ system without holding costs
and with transportation costs, and let (N, c) be its associated cost game. If (N, c) is subadditive, then
TL(N, c) ∈ Core(N, c).
To finish this section we include an example in which we compute the proposal of the two-
lines rule for a system. Notice that the computation of this rule is not too hard. For instance, it
is typically much simpler computing it than computing the Shapley value.
Example 4.4. Consider now the basic EOQ system without holding costs and with transportation costs
given in Example 4.1. The associated cost game is given by
S {1} {2} {3} {4} {5} {1, 2} {1, 3} {1, 4} {1, 5} {2, 3} {2, 4} {2, 5}
c(S) 35.0 63.0 45.0 65 60 63 52.5 65 70 67.5 73.125 90
S {3, 4} {3, 5} {4, 5} {1, 2, 3} {1, 2, 4} {1, 2, 5} {1, 3, 4} {1, 3, 5} {1, 4, 5}
c(S) 65 60 80 67.5 73.125 90 65 70 80
S {2, 3, 4} {2, 3, 5} {2, 4, 5} {3, 4, 5} {1, 2, 3, 4} {1, 2, 3, 5} {1, 2, 4, 5} {1, 3, 4, 5}
c(S) 73.125 90 90 80 73.125 90 90 80
S {2, 3, 4, 5} N
c(S) 90 90
It can be easily checked that (N, c) is subadditive using Theorem 4.1. It is clear that
• Π1(N, c) = {(2, 4, 1, 3, 5), (2, 4, 1, 5, 3)}, and
• Π2(N, c) = {(5, 4, 3, 2, 1)} .
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Finally, the proposal of the two-lines rule is
TL(N, c) =
m(2,4,1,3,5)(N, c) + m(2,4,1,5,3)(N, c)
4
+
m(5,4,3,2,1)(N, c)
2
=
(0, 63, 0, 10.125, 16.875) + (0, 63, 0, 10.125, 16.875)
4
+
(0, 10, 0, 20, 60)
2
= (0, 36.50, 0, 15.062, 38.438).
It might seem unfair that farms 1 and 3 pay nothing according to TL. However, this follows from the
fact that these two farms are not far from the supplier and, moreover, have small ratios demand capacity.
Favoring the proximity to the supplier and a capacity of the warehouse in accordance with the demand
can only have positive effects on the cooperation and on the supplier’s interests.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we identify a centralized inventory problem arising in a farming community in
northwestern Spain and we model it using two alternative approaches.
In the first approach we assume that the supplier charges a fixed fee every time that an agent
or a set of agents places an order. In this context we show that it is profitable for the agents
to place joint orders, we obtain an optimal order policy and use cooperative game theory, in
particular the Shapley value, to indicate how the total cost can be shared by the agents. In this
context the Shapley value provides stable allocations.
In the second approach we assume that the supplier charges a fixed fee plus a variable
transportation fee every time that an agent or a set of agents places an order. In this context we
give a necessary and sufficient condition under which it is profitable for the agents to place joint
orders (making two extra assumptions about their location and the supplier pricing policy).
We again use cooperative game theory to design a rule for allocating the total cost among the
cooperating agents and to study its properties.
Appendix
Here, the reader can find the proofs of the main theorems stated in this paper.
Proof of Theorem 4.1.
Proof. Assume first that (N, c) is subadditive and take a pair of non-empty coalitions S, T ⊂ N
with S ∩ T = ∅ and maxi∈S{ai} ≤ maxi∈T{ai}. It holds that
c(S ∪ T) = max
i∈S∪T
{a + ai} max
i∈S∪T
{ di
Ki
} = max
i∈T
{a + ai} max
i∈S∪T
{ di
Ki
}.
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Then, the subadditivity condition implies that
max
i∈T
{a + ai}(max
i∈S∪T
{ di
Ki
} −max
i∈T
{ di
Ki
}) ≤ max
i∈S
{a + ai}max
i∈S
{ di
Ki
}.
If maxi∈S{ diKi } > maxi∈T{
di
Ki
}, then maxi∈S∪T{ diKi } = maxi∈S{
di
Ki
}. Thus, dividing both sides by
maxi∈T{a + ai}maxi∈S{ diKi }, the inequality above becomes
1− maxi∈T{
di
Ki
}
maxi∈S{ diKi }
≤ maxi∈S{a + ai}
maxi∈T{a + ai}
which is equivalent to
maxi∈T{ai} −maxi∈S{ai}
a +maxi∈T{ai} ≤
maxi∈T{ diKi }
maxi∈S{ diKi }
.
Conversely, take a pair of non-empty coalitions S, T ⊂ N with S ∩ T = ∅ and maxi∈S{ai} ≤
maxi∈T{ai}. If condition 1 in the statement holds, then
c(S ∪ T) = max
i∈S∪T
{a + ai} max
i∈S∪T
{ di
Ki
} = max
i∈T
{a + ai}max
i∈T
{ di
Ki
} = c(T) ≤ c(S) + c(T).
If condition 2 in the statement holds, then
(max
i∈T
{ai} −max
i∈S
{ai})max
i∈S
{ di
Ki
} ≤ max
i∈T
{a + ai}max
i∈T
{ di
Ki
}
and
c(S) + c(T) = maxi∈S{a + ai}maxi∈S{ diKi }+maxi∈T{a + ai}maxi∈T{
di
Ki
}
≥ maxi∈S{a + ai}maxi∈S{ diKi }+ (maxi∈T{ai} −maxi∈S{ai})maxi∈S{
di
Ki
}
= maxi∈T{a + ai}maxi∈S{ diKi } = maxi∈S∪T{a + ai}maxi∈S∪T{
di
Ki
} = c(S ∪ T).
Proof of Theorem 4.2.
Proof. Take σ ∈ Π(N) satisfying that σ−1(1) ∈ N is an agent whose distance to the supplier is
maximal. We prove that mσ(N, c) belongs to the core of (N, c). It suffices to show that for every
non-empty coalition S ⊂ N, it holds that ∑i∈S mσi (N, c) ≤ c(S). We distinguish two cases.
a) S contains the agent σ−1(1). Then,
∑
i∈S
mσi (N, c) = c(σ
−1(1)) + ∑
j∈S\{σ−1(1)}
(
c(Pσj ∪ {j})− c(Pσj )
)
= c(σ−1(1)) + ∑
j∈S\{σ−1(1)}
(
(a +max
i∈N
{ai}) max
i∈Pσj ∪{j}
{ di
Ki
} − (a +max
i∈N
{ai})max
i∈Pσj
{ di
Ki
}
)
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= ∑
j∈S
(a +max
i∈N
{ai})
(
max
i∈Pσj ∪{j}
{ di
Ki
} −max
i∈Pσj
{ di
Ki
}
)
≤ ∑
j∈S
(a +max
i∈N
{ai})
(
max
i∈(Pσj ∪{j})∩S
{ di
Ki
} − max
i∈Pσj ∩S
{ di
Ki
}
)
= (a +max
i∈N
{ai})∑
j∈S
(
max
i∈(Pσj ∪{j})∩S
{ di
Ki
} − max
i∈Pσj ∩S
{ di
Ki
}
)
= (a +max
i∈S
{ai})max
i∈S
{ di
Ki
}
= c(S),
where the inequality follows from the fact that the function f (x) = max{x, y} − x is non-
increasing in x for all y ∈ [0,∞) (and taking y = djKj ).
b) S does not contain the agent σ−1(1). In this case denote S¯ = S ∪ {σ−1(1)}. Using the
same proof above we conclude that
∑
i∈S¯
mσi (N, c) ≤ c(S¯).
Now, taking into account that mσ
σ−1(1)(N, c) = c(σ
−1(1)) and that (N, c) is subadditive, it
holds that
c(σ−1(1)) +∑
i∈S
mσi (N, c) = ∑
i∈S¯
mσi (N, c) ≤ c(S¯) ≤ c(σ−1(1)) + c(S),
which implies that ∑i∈S mσi (N, c) ≤ c(S).
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